



Fairwork



LABOUR STANDARDS IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY

CHILE 2025



Internet Society
Foundation



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Executive Summary

In this fourth Fairwork report for Chile, we evaluate working conditions in the Chilean platform economy using the five Fairwork principles: Fair Pay, Fair Conditions, Fair Contracts, Fair Management, and Fair Representation. These principles have guided Fairwork's research in more than 40 countries. For this year's Chile ratings, we analysed eight platforms: one care and domestic services platform (Cronoshare), the four most widely used ride-hailing platforms (Cabify, Uber, Didi, inDrive), and the three delivery platforms operating in the country (Uber Eats, PedidosYa, Rappi).

According to the results presented in this report, although Chile has a specific regulation for app-based delivery workers and drivers (Law 21.341, in force since 2022), much remains to be done. Out of a maximum score of 10 points, only two platforms (Cabify and PedidosYa) were able to obtain 5 and 4 points, respectively. Workers continue to face limited access to information about platform transparency—both algorithmic and related to pricing—as well as communication channels that are often insufficient for resolving doubts or operational problems. While interviews suggest that workers' incomes have improved, it remains unclear whether all workers can access a minimum wage by working in their respective platforms, let alone secure living wages. These issues, combined with the Labour Directorate's (Dirección del Trabajo) limited capacity to oversee and enforce the application of the law, highlight ongoing gaps in the governance of platform work in Chile. Additionally, the widespread practice of account renting—and the security and control issues it generates—underscores the need for stronger measures to ensure fairer working conditions.

One area of progress identified both in our qualitative research and in the latest report from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare¹ on the implementation of Law 21.341 concerns the tax formalisation of independent platform workers through the issuance of professional services invoices or receipts ("boletas de honorarios" in Spanish).

The results presented in this report show both changes and continuities compared to previous reports. First, workers appear to be slightly better informed about the need to issue invoices to receive payments. However, concerns persist regarding account renting and the lack of transparency in relation to algorithmic management, as well as communication processes, deactivations, and appeals. Likewise, although platforms have made some attempts to improve communication systems, workers continue to find these channels impersonal and are unable to resolve their delivery or transport-related problems.

The low scores achieved this year reflect the ongoing lack of transparency and accountability among the companies evaluated. They also reflect that the high costs associated with conducting platform work (such as paying for gas and vehicle maintenance, which can take up 40% of workers' earnings) are largely paid by the workers themselves, and social security benefits are still scarce. We hope that future Fairwork reports for Chile will show improvements in these areas.




Scores

FAIRWORK CHILE 2025



Minimum standards of fair work



The breakdown of scores for individual platforms is available at: [FAIR.WORK/CHILE](https://fair.work/chile)



Key findings



Fair Pay

The first threshold for this principle requires platforms to guarantee a minimum wage after costs for all their workers. In five of the eight platforms analysed in Chile, it was possible to observe that all workers earn at least the legal minimum wage after costs of CLP 529,000 (approximately USD 580) for a 44-hour working week.² Although most of the interviews we conducted with workers confirmed that they receive at least CLP 2,903 (approximately USD 3.20) per hour, meeting Chile’s hourly minimum, in the case of three platforms we did not obtain evidence that this applies universally to all workers. This limits the ability to guarantee a higher standard of living wages for all workers. According to the Global Living Wage Coalition, fair pay standards in Chile are set at CLP 811,442 (approximately USD 885)³, which could only be assessed in the cases of Cabify and Pedidos Ya.



Fair Conditions

Only two of the evaluated platforms received points for the Fair Conditions principle. Regarding the first threshold, which involves mitigating the risks associated with platform work, only Cabify and Pedidos Ya were able to demonstrate that they provide accident insurance and basic safety equipment. Platforms such as Uber, Uber Eats, and inDrive offer insurance against accidents and theft, but with exclusions that leave many workers unprotected. With respect to the second threshold under this principle, no platform provides social security measures such as paid sick leave, holidays, or maternity benefits.



Fair Contracts

Five of the eight platforms (Cabify, DiDi, Uber, UberEats, and PedidosYa) received the first point for fair contracts, which is obtained if platforms provide clear, transparent terms under national law. These five platforms require workers to sign a contract, complying with Chilean law, and ensuring continuous access and secure data handling. In contrast, Rappi could not show that it requires explicit consent to its terms, while inDrive and Cronoshare are not properly established in Chile, which excludes them from national law applicability and therefore prevents them from meeting this requirement. None of the platforms qualified for the second point either, which is given when platforms contain no unfair clauses in their terms and contracts, as they could not demonstrate that they disclose how algorithms set dynamic fares, or acknowledge shared responsibility for risks or negligence.




Fair Management

Only one of the eight platforms received points for the Fairwork principle of Fair Management (Cabify). For the first threshold, platforms must provide evidence of clear communication channels and due process for decisions that affect workers (for example, deactivations and appeals). The second threshold is met if there is also evidence that platforms ensure fairness in their management processes and actively seek to remove barriers for disadvantaged groups. Workers interviewed across all platforms reported unclear and ineffective channels for appealing disciplinary measures or account deactivations, with no documented evidence of access to human support, nor transparency regarding the functioning and criteria of algorithms used for work allocation.



Fair Representation

No platform demonstrated compliance with the fair representation Fairwork principle. To receive the first point, evidence must be found that platforms foster the conditions necessary for workers to express their collective voice. While Cabify expresses openness to dialogue through their platform, we found no evidence that any platform guarantees workers' freedom of association or collective voice, preventing the assignment of the first point. The second point is assigned to platforms if evidence is found that they effectively incorporate workers' voices in decisions that affect their working conditions or engage with workers' bodies. However, no platform could demonstrate that they recognise worker organisations or include workers or their representatives in governance or decision-making processes, making it impossible to award the second point under this principle.



EDITORIAL

Changing Work Standards in Digital Labour Platforms: The 2025 Chile Report

Platform work refers to the activity promoted and organised by a digital platform that allows for the “exchange of work among different users, such as companies, workers, and consumers”.⁴ Since 2021, as part of the Fairwork project, we have been analysing the working conditions of those engaged in the platform economy according to the Fairwork principles, focusing specifically on digital platforms that offer on-demand, geographically tethered work. These platforms coordinate services such as food delivery or transportation of a person from one part of the city to another.


In September 2022, Law 21,431 regulating platform work in Chile—specifically the work of app-based drivers and delivery workers—came into force.⁵ This regulation has introduced some improvements in working conditions, but it has also revealed several unresolved challenges (see “Legal Context” in this report for more details). For example, a recent report by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security⁶ highlights a significant increase in the formalisation of workers, particularly evident in the rise of electronic service receipts issued by third parties (boletas de honorarios). However, the analysis identifies critical gaps in the implementation of the law, especially regarding a lack of contractual transparency, limited understanding of the grounds for contract termination, and low coverage of damage insurance and occupational safety training.

Overall, the comparison between 2023 and 2024 confirms two key dynamics: rapid sectoral growth after the implementation of Law 21.431, and a persistent workforce composition characterised by strong male dominance, high participation of migrant workers, and a predominantly young labour force.

While the Ministry of Labour and Social Security’s evaluation of the law provides encouraging results, it also highlights several outstanding issues. These include the need to strengthen enforcement processes and to establish effective large-scale training mechanisms (see “Country Context” for more details). As shown in the qualitative findings of our study, the workers we interviewed still do not fully understand their rights or the implications of the new law for their daily work routines. Moreover, as noted in our previous report,⁷ account renting remains an ongoing challenge for both platforms and workers (see “Legal Context” for more details). This practice has allowed workers in precarious situations—such as migrants undergoing regularisation—to circumvent formalisation

requirements, avoid platform sanctions, and continue working. However, it also undermines the exercising of labour rights, since the individuals performing the work are not the official contract holders. Additionally, platforms have yet to demonstrate substantial improvements in their communication channels with workers, particularly regarding information about the social protection and security benefits to which they are entitled under the law.

Highlighting the challenges of platform work is crucial to understanding the broader destabilisation of traditional labour relations and the pressure on welfare systems. As algorithmic management spreads across industries and public services, it is reshaping work dynamics and the organisation of social rights, raising urgent questions about how to regulate these transformations fairly. Addressing these issues requires the involvement of companies, policymakers, workers, and researchers to ensure that flexibility in these emerging markets does not come at the cost of greater precarity. We hope our findings support ongoing discussions on improving working conditions in this sector, recognising both the specific characteristics of platform workers and the limited alternatives many face in the labour market.





COUNTRY CONTEXT

Instability, Weak Employment, and the Growth of the Platform Economy

Recent labour market data in Chile reflects a persistently weak and fragile employment environment. According to CLAPES UC, unemployment has remained above 8% for nearly three consecutive years (2023-2025), while formal private employment shows signs of contraction and long-term unemployment continues to rise. Even in a stable macroeconomic context, job creation, particularly formal job creation, has failed to recover its historical dynamism. This broader fragility provides the structural backdrop for the rapid expansion and consolidation of the platform economy.

The platform economy has grown significantly in Chile, reaching 3.2 per cent of the employed population—almost 297,000 people—in the March-May 2025 quarter, representing a 45 per cent increase since 2022.⁹ Platform activities accounted for 3.5 per cent of Chilean GDP in 2021.¹⁰ This expansion unfolds within a labour market marked by persistent unemployment, averaging between 8.4 and 8.9 per cent over the past year,¹¹ alongside 26.2 per cent informality.¹²

Workers on digital platforms regulated by Law No. 21.431—platforms dedicated to parcel pick-up, delivery and distribution, or small-scale passenger transport—have experienced sustained growth since the law came into effect. In Chile today, just over 3% of the workforce engages in some form of platform work.¹³ The number of people working in this sector has doubled since September 2022, increasing from roughly 40,000 to nearly 76,000 by December 2024.¹⁴ Throughout 2024, an average of 65,597 people reported platform work regulated by the law as their main occupation each month, a figure that rises to 71,233 when including those who hold it as a second job. These workers represented 0.77% of the total employed population in Chile during that year.¹⁵

The platform work sector remains strongly male-dominated. In 2024, 87.4% of workers covered by the law were men, while only 12.6% were women. Administrative records, such as digital tax receipts (“Boletas de prestación de servicios de terceros electrónica”, or BTE) data from 2022 to 2024, reinforce this pattern, with men accounting for 85.6% of issuers.¹⁶

While 40 per cent of platform workers in Chile are between 18 and 34 years old, workers aged 35 to 54 now represent 48.7 per cent, nearly four.¹⁷ Platform work increasingly attracts a highly educated workforce: 53 per cent hold higher-education degrees, compared with 48 per cent in the traditional labour sector.

Migration remains a defining feature of platform work. Migrants represented 17.5 per cent of platform workers in Chile in 2025—about 52,000 people—seven percentage points above the traditional labour market.¹⁸ The higher presence of migrant workers in the



platform economy might point to the lower barrier to entry into platform work compared to the more traditional labour market, where migrant workers face significant employment challenges: in mid-2025, the estimated unemployment rate for foreign workers was 8.1%.

The Implementation of Law 21,431: Progress and Limitations

Among platforms regulated by Law 21,431, the workforce nearly doubled from approximately 40,000 when the law took effect in September 2022 to nearly 76,000 by December 2024.¹⁹ The majority of this workforce works in transportation (83.4 per cent) rather than delivery, is classified as self-employed (84.2 per cent), and remains heavily masculinised (87.4 per cent are men). Migrants represent a disproportionately high share, at 41.7 per cent, of these formalised workers.²⁰

Despite the law’s formalisation efforts, informality remains stubbornly high. Among independent platform workers under Law 21,431, the informal employment rate averaged 73.7 per cent in 2024, declining modestly from 78.5 per cent in 2023; a reduction of just five percentage points.²¹ While informality dipped below 70 per cent during August–November 2024, signalling a gradual improvement, the overall picture suggests limited progress.

This persistent informality translates directly into inadequate social protection. Across the broader platform sector, coverage remains critically limited. In 2019, only 31 per cent of delivery workers had pension coverage, and just 19 per cent had accident insurance.²² By 2025, while 68 per cent reported employer pension contributions, this still falls far short of the 85 per cent coverage in traditional employment.²³ The gap proves even starker for accident or illness insurance: only 19 per cent of platform workers have coverage, compared with 92 per cent among traditional delivery workers.²⁴ Consequently, workers continue facing daily exposure to traffic accidents, robberies, and assaults with minimal institutional protection or platform response.

Beyond inadequate social protection, algorithmic management further restricts worker autonomy. Workers face minimal decision-making power, rating systems that reinforce dependency, and constant deactivation threats.²⁵ Although platforms classify workers as independent contractors, algorithmic control replicates conditions typical of traditional employment relationships, creating a paradox of formal independence with practical subordination.





The Platform Ecosystem in Chile

Major ride-hailing platforms operating in Chile include Uber, Cabify, Didi, and InDrive. Some operate regional offices while others do not, and all define themselves as technological intermediaries, a classification that strategically limits their formal labour obligations.²⁶ Uber maintains the largest driver and user base.²⁷

In the delivery sector, platforms such as Rappi, PedidosYa, and Uber Eats dominate the market. PedidosYa accounts for 62 per cent of consumer preference, followed by Uber Eats with 33 per cent.²⁸ New platforms continue to enter the Chilean market. Cronoshare, a Spanish marketplace connecting clients with service providers (home repair, pet care, tutoring, and similar services), recorded over 300,000 visits and 21,000 service requests in Chile this year.²⁹

Chile now has 3.1 million active platform transport users. In June 2025 alone, 17 million trips were recorded, a 14 per cent annual increase.³⁰ Platforms consistently outperform taxis in consumer evaluations: 80 per cent of users highlight better waiting times compared to just 30 per cent for taxis.

Precarious Working Conditions

Platform work proves highly unstable. Only 29 per cent of workers remain in platform work after three months, compared with 93.4 per cent retention in traditional jobs.³¹ Most eventually exit the sector: 65.6 per cent transition into traditional employment, while 5.4 per cent fall into unemployment.³² With approximately 78 per cent working independently, persistent informality remains the norm.

Working conditions show multiple weak points. Delivery workers often report 10-15 daily working hours, and transport drivers 6-7.³³ Platform workers average 38.1 weekly hours—slightly below the 41.2 hours in traditional employment.³⁴

The Weakness of Collective Action

Worker coordination occurs mostly through informal channels such as WhatsApp and Facebook groups, especially among migrants and women. These networks provide mutual support, share information, help resolve daily conflicts, and foster solidarity in a context where both employers and the state remain largely absent.³⁵ Although dispersed, these networks reveal workers' need to “humanise” a labour relationship that reduces them to mere app users.³⁶

Protest and collective action remain markedly limited. While the first coordinated mobilisations of platform workers emerged in 2019,³⁷ and the pandemic exposed long-standing inequalities—including unregulated schedules, unstable rates, and lack of insurance³⁸⁻³⁹⁻⁴⁰—mobilisation declined sharply in the post-pandemic years due to low organisation, weak leadership, and widespread perceptions that collective action does not produce structural change.⁴¹



According to the COES Conflict Observatory⁴²—which recorded 38,551 protests between 2005 and 2024—the 2019 social uprising was the most intense moment of the entire period, accounting for 10.8 per cent of all protests. In sharp contrast, 2024 marks the lowest level of mobilisation, with only 2.3 per cent of all protests, reflecting a broader national decline in collective action. This weakened mobilisation landscape further reinforces workers' vulnerability within the platform economy.



LEGAL CONTEXT

Platform Resistance and Institutional Response in the Platform Economy

Chile has recently passed Law 21,431 (2022) and Law 21,553 (2023) to integrate platform workers into the Labour Code. However, implementation has been slow and technically complex, revealing a significant gap between legislative intent and practical outcomes. Platform coordination against the law remains strong. In late 2025, Alianza publicly criticised its regulatory requirements, citing technological difficulty and sensitive data management concerns.⁴³ Critics argue that platform influence has contributed to delays in its effective enforcement.

In response, Chile's transport and labour ministries created a tripartite digital platform table ("Mesa de plataformas digitales") regulated under Law 21,431, which brings together the Undersecretary of Labour and representatives of both workers and employers. This roundtable has convened multiple times to discuss implementation challenges, clarify doubts, and negotiate practical solutions.⁴⁴

Results show decidedly mixed progress. On the one hand, Law 21,431 has achieved important advances in formalising digital platform work: companies are complying better with payment requirements and deadlines; the number of formalised workers issuing invoices has increased notably since April 2024; clearer channels have been established for worker inquiries and complaints; and companies are providing better information about disconnection times.⁴⁵ Since March 2024, approximately 180,000 electronic receipts and 120,000 formalised contracts have been recorded.⁴⁶

On the other hand, significant gaps persist that undermine the law's effectiveness. As will be explained in the following section, there is a persistent lack of transparency in how rates are calculated and how algorithms assign work. Many workers do not know where company offices are located or how to contact them directly. Important gaps remain in occupational safety training and risk prevention. Awareness of the new rules also remains low: over 30 per cent of Uber drivers and 20 per cent of delivery workers do not fully understand their contracts.⁴⁷

The structural challenge runs even deeper: it is estimated that 85 per cent of platform workers do not meet the eligibility criteria established by current legislation,⁴⁸ suggesting that regulations may unintentionally restrict work opportunities for the majority. Most Uber workers continue to prioritise flexibility over formalisation, highlighting the fundamental tension between regulatory efforts and individual worker motivations.⁴⁹

Three years on: the challenges of implementation

Three years into the application of a specialised legal regime—formed mainly by Law N° 21,431 on working conditions in platform work—it's worth asking about its application and impact from a legal perspective.

While no comprehensive study exists at the time of writing, the information available allows for some assessment in two areas essential for the correct implementation of these rules: (i) knowledge and perception; and (ii) enforcement. Given the known characteristics of this sector, these two issues are particularly relevant. As the most recent report on the implementation of Law N° 21,431 reveals,⁵⁰ the opacity of some of the main tools used by platform companies hinders any effort by workers and public authorities to understand and assess the conditions under which services are rendered. In turn, low levels of knowledge and the perception that the rules do not provide adequate protection have a negative impact on the authorities' capacity to enforce the rules. As the report attests, a lack of technical knowledge about algorithmic control and other features of these companies have rendered the Labour Inspectorate's enforcement efforts ineffective.

Better-known rules?

In our previous report,⁵¹ we considered the results of a study conducted by the Centre for Public Policy at the Catholic University, Chile. Its results, while hardly representative, revealed low levels of knowledge about the details of the new regulation among Uber drivers.⁵²

This trend seems to have partially changed, albeit not in a consistent manner. A study commissioned by the Ministry of Labour gauged the perceptions of those working for platform companies, producing interesting yet complex results.⁵³ In areas where the provisions of Law N° 21,431 introduced basic protections, significant numbers of workers revealed that they do not know the mechanisms available to protect their rights. In matters ranging from the procedures to challenge terminations, changes in their contractual terms, or the legal address of the platform company, a significant number of interviewed workers did not have enough (or any) information. Some of the data reveals problems in the application of the rules; almost half of the workers claimed not to have access to their contracts, while over 57% declared that arbitrary and temporary deactivations are a common practice.

A detailed questionnaire on distinct areas of the law revealed higher levels of knowledge in certain areas (close to 60% in most areas, some over 80%). Still, the choice of provisions to test is certainly odd: most questions are based on the rules applicable to "dependent platform workers"—the category with the higher level of protection—or some of the general rules applicable to both categories, while only a few cover the "independent worker category"—the one with fewer protections and, unsurprisingly, the one used in almost all of the contracts reviewed in the report. The study concludes that the legislation has contributed to formalising contracts but identifies significant gaps in terms of knowledge and transparency. The former

point sits oddly with the Labour Inspectorate's recognition of a significant number of undocumented workers rendering services via account renting and other mechanisms, as we will see.

The picture that emerges from this report is complex. While knowledge of a number of the provisions contained in Law N° 21,431 has improved, significant gaps remain in some of the most critical areas, namely those that are intended to protect basic rights.

Enforcement: major challenges

Perhaps the most salient implementation challenge comes in the form of enforcement. The report we have cited throughout these pages paints a dismal picture: more than three years after the rules came into force, the authorities recognise that the Labour Inspectorate does not have the resources or capacities to effectively verify compliance with rules on matters like the identification of markers of worker status or the adequate use of algorithms and other means of automatic decision-making.

In its assessment of the enforcement efforts conducted by the Labour Inspectorate, the report notes a significant number of gaps.⁵⁴ The most significant include the inability to access the companies' main offices and an excessive emphasis on infractions not related to the new regulation; this in turn lays bare the lack of preparation to understand the diverse realities of platform work. Indeed, two of the most significant challenges for compliance and enforcement of the rules are the existence of a significant number of undocumented workers within delivery platforms, and their use of "loaned" accounts to bypass mechanisms to formalise the relationship. This grey zone represents a major challenge for the protection of basic rights for those working in the sector, and the tone of the report does not indicate any clear strategy to confront these problems.

The scenario is compounded by the stunning lack of preparation to verify compliance and enforce a series of rules that had been in place for more than two years at the time of the report's drafting. The Labour Inspectorate's initial dynamism to interpret the new rules and reflect on the legal reasoning required to apply them—reflected in their well-thought-out initial pronouncements—seems to have deserted the later stages of implementation. The challenges are significant, and those tasked with facing them don't seem to have the required tools.

The regulation of transportation services: the wait continues

In parallel with all the above, Law N° 21,553 remains in limbo. At the time of writing, the authorities have not produced a definitive version of this regulation, which is required by the legislation as a condition for its coming into force. In the twilight of the current administration, one may wonder if the wait will outlast its final days.

Latin America's Regulatory Context: A Fragmented Debate

Regulatory interest in addressing the realities of the platform economy extends beyond Brazil to numerous Latin American countries, with some making significant progress in establishing national regulatory regimes (see Table 1). As shown in the table, different regulations address the issue of platform work in various ways. Some resolve the debate over the dependency of workers on both delivery and ride-hailing platforms, while others officially codify the narrative of independent work by law. Additionally, some regulations clearly outline the need for platforms to establish a legal presence in the country, while others do not address this topic. Lastly, the table reveals a fragmented debate where workers' associations have different interpretations of what regulation of the platform economy should look like.

Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
Law No. 20,396 (2025)	 Uruguay	Yes	Origin of the initiative: Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Dependency/autonomy of working people: It doesn't resolve the issue. It allows for dependent and independent contracts. Worker support: The trade union center (PIT-CNT) has expressed its rejection. Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Common rights:</u> Transparency of algorithms and monitoring systems; the right to an explanation; the right to the intangibility of digital reputation and data portability; terms and conditions must be transparent, concise, and easily accessible. <u>Platform obligations:</u> Risk assessment and preventive measures, as well as worker training. Companies are not required to establish a legal entity in the country. However, disputes between workers living in Uruguay and platforms must be submitted to national courts. <u>Rights of dependent workers:</u> 48-hour weekly work limit; minimum wage. <u>Rights of independent workers:</u> Occupational accidents and diseases; social security benefits (simplified tax regime); freedom of association and collective bargaining.



Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
Bill “Labor Modernization Law” 35/2025	 Argentina	In process	Origin of the initiative: Executive branch (Officialist bloc). Introduced in Congress as part of a broader labor reform bill. Dependence/autonomy of workers: It creates the category of “independent service provider”, explicitly excluding these workers from any presumption of an employment relationship. Worker support: trade unions reject the proposal while atomized workers’ positions are mixed. Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Platform obligations:</u> respect freedom of connection; offer safety information; facilitate access to safety equipment; maintain a digital complaints mechanism; and ensure access to human operators able to justify decisions affecting workers. Platforms must also disclose ranking criteria “in clear language,” subject to commercial secrecy limits. <u>Workers’ rights:</u> right to reject orders, connect without any minimum frequency, and freely choose their schedules, routes, and use of the app. They may exercise data portability rights, receive free training, and benefit from a personal accident insurance policy. They also receive full payment for their services and 100% of tips.
Bill “Regulating work in digital mobility and home delivery platform companies”	 Paraguay	In process	Origin of the initiative: Legislative power Dependency/autonomy of workers: The employment relationship remains unresolved, resulting in a generic category of individuals providing mobility and delivery platform services. Worker support: Delivery and transportation workers participated in the debate, with split positions on the project, particularly on the job status discussions. Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Workers’ rights:</u> A Permanent Working Group is established where workers can participate, and guarantees are established against discrimination. It also establishes a guarantee that workers carry out their activities in working conditions that prevent occupational hazards and ensure health. <u>Platform obligations:</u> A person must establish a legal entity in the country and a physical space to serve workers. It is mandatory to establish identity verification mechanisms for all individuals in the platform ecosystem. It is compulsory to develop anti-discrimination measures on the platform, as well as measures for protecting personal data.



Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
Law 2466 of 2025 Congress of the Republic of Colombia	 Colombia	Yes	Origin of the initiative: Ministry of Labour (Executive) and Legislative Power. Dependence/autonomy of workers: It doesn’t solve the problem. It allows workers to choose between being employees and independent contractors at their discretion. The reform refers to digital delivery platform workers. It doesn’t include other sectors of the platform economy (such as transportation and cloud work although it includes a specific chapter for teleworking). Worker support: Mixed reactions. Acceptance from some unions that supported the project’s development, and opposition from some delivery organisations. Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Workers’ rights:</u> Social Security: For dependent workers, payments are established according to the comprehensive social security system, in the proportions defined by current regulations. For independent workers, a shared contribution system is established between the company and the worker. The company must ensure coverage for occupational risk. <u>Platform obligations:</u> Clearly inform employees about the scope of the work modality through the digital delivery platform or the technological tool to which they have access. Notice of contract modification prior to its entry into force, right to file complaints, and verification. Enterprise must register workers with the Ministry of Labor and report on the use of automated systems for managing and distributing tasks.
Bill No. 018 “Law that recognizes labor benefits for workers who provide delivery, courier, and mobility services through digital platforms.”	 Peru	In Process	Origin of the initiative: Congress of the Republic Dependence/autonomy of workers: Establishes dependency for workers with a work day of no less than 4 hours per day or 20 hours per week. Worker support: The Trade Union Central (CATP by its Spanish acronym) showed its support. Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: <u>Workers’ rights:</u> A 48-hour work week with a 30-minute break is established. Overtime is considered if the established time is exceeded. Contracts are awarded, and accident, disability, and death insurance, as well as health insurance, is provided. Labor inspections are carried out by the SUNAFIL. <u>Platform obligations:</u> Creation of a registry of workers on delivery, transportation, and logistics platforms. Delivery and periodic renewal of personal protective equipment. Establishment of a system for handling complaints and reporting of acts of sexual harassment and/or discrimination. Respect for freedom of association. Issuance of employment certificates.



Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
PLP 12/2024	 Brazil	In Process	Origin of the initiative: Federal government. Dependence/autonomy of workers: Does not resolve. Allows for dependent and independent contracts. Worker support: The bill arose from a dispute with government, business, and labor representatives. Organizations such as the Brazilian Association of Labor Studies (ABET by its portuguese acronym) and the Public Ministry of Labor (MPT by its portuguese acronym) point to potential unconstitutionality and rights violations in the bill. Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: Although the PLP (Complementary Bill) recognizes the category of “self-employed platform worker,” which applies to app-based drivers. The bill does not establish an employment relationship along the lines of the CLT (Consolidation of Labor Laws) between drivers and platform companies. The proposal does not specify the requirement for the company to have its formal headquarters in Brazil in order to operate. <u>Workers’ rights:</u> It limits the working day to 12 hours; it includes the definition of a minimum wage per kilometer traveled; it establishes Social Security contributions, with 8% of the minimum income being paid by the worker and 20% by the platform; <u>Platform obligations:</u> It focuses exclusively on ride-hailing app drivers and does not cover delivery drivers or motorcyclists; it establishes mandatory union representation mechanisms for collective bargaining, reducing work-related risks, and eliminating all forms of discrimination, violence, and harassment at work.
Law 21.431	 Chile	Yes	Origin of the initiative: Legislative power Dependence/autonomy of workers: Allows contracts as dependent and independent. Worker support: The project emerged from various legislative initiatives presented by political parties and from rounds of negotiations and presentations by platform companies. Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: This law regulates the relationships between digital platform workers and digital platform companies providing services in the country. <u>Workers’ rights:</u> The use of automated decision-making mechanisms for discrimination is prohibited. Workers must have access to training and protective equipment. Collective rights of workers are also established. <u>Platform obligations:</u> The platform has a duty to protect workers, including regulating the length of the workday, ensuring fair compensation or fees, and guaranteeing access to the social security system. Workers have the right to disconnect and must receive prior notice of contract termination. The company is also required to provide information about the service offered. A basis for calculating legal severance pay in the event of dismissal is also established.

Initiative/ Law	Country	Approved?	Summary
Bill to Regulate the Employment Relationship of Workers with Digital Platform Companies	 Ecuador	In the legislative process (report for the second plenary debate)	Origin of the initiative: Legislative power. Dependence/autonomy of workers: Recognises delivery work mediated by digital platforms as a form of dependent work recognised by the Labour Code. Worker support: T: In earlier stages of this bill, the platform workers’ collective FRENAPP expressed its opposition to the creation of two categories of workers—dependent and independent—and advocated for the general recognition of platform workers. The collective “Unión de trabajadores de plataformas Quito” also rejected the bill, arguing that it could “destroy jobs.” Rights and obligations for the platform ecosystem: The original initiative was merged with two other bills, modifying the initial proposal. The report for the committee’s second debate includes: <u>Common rights:</u> establishment of a dependency relationship, right to disconnection, right to free association. <u>Obligations of companies:</u> Designation of an official channel for worker complaints and objections, establishment of a physical office, maintenance of an updated worker database, provision of ongoing training for workers, user awareness, provision of work implements free of charge, and availability of information regarding evaluations by users and businesses. <u>Workers’ rights:</u> social security and all rights recognised to employees. Use: In December 2024, a party introduced a bill titled “Organic Law for the Protection of Digital Service Platform Workers.” This bill proposes mandatory employment contracts between workers and companies, recognising the employment relationship. Additionally, it proposes the establishment of a physical office and a virtual channel, the provision of supplies and free internet access, as well as life insurance. The bill has not been assigned to any committee, so its public debate has not yet begun.
As an effort to participate in the ongoing International Labour Organisation (ILO) debates towards a platform regulation, in April 2025, the Latin American countries involved in the Fairwork project launched the “Declaración de Asunción”, a collective statement issued by Fairwork Latin American researchers as well civil society organisations in the region and globally, to defend the fundamental rights of workers on digital platforms in Latin America. It was developed collaboratively and focuses on ensuring occupational health and safety, algorithmic transparency, data protection, fair remuneration and dispute resolution mechanisms; all from a Latin American perspective. ⁵⁵			

THE FAIRWORK PROJECT


Towards Fair Labour Standards in the Platform Economy

Fairwork evaluates and ranks the working conditions of digital platforms. Our ratings are based on five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure in order to be considered to be offering basic minimum standards of fairness.

We evaluate platforms annually against these principles to show not only what the platform economy is today, but also what it can be. The Fairwork ratings provide an independent perspective on labour conditions of platform work for policymakers, platform companies, workers, and consumers. Our goal is to show that better, fairer, jobs are possible in the platform economy.

The Fairwork project is coordinated by the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, and the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. Our network of researchers has rated platforms in 41 countries across five continents. In every country, Fairwork collaborates closely with workers, platforms, advocates and policymakers to promote a fairer future of platform work. In Chile, this research is led by researchers at Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez.

FAIRWORK COUNTRIES

**AFRICA:**

Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda

ASIA:

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

EUROPE:

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Poland, Serbia, Spain, UK

SOUTH AMERICA:

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

NORTH AMERICA:

Mexico, US

THE FAIRWORK FRAMEWORK

Fairwork evaluates the working conditions of digital labour platforms and ranks them on how well they do. To do this, we use five principles that digital labour platforms should ensure to be considered as offering ‘fair work’.

The five Fairwork principles were developed through a multi-stakeholder workshop at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and many more workshops in various countries. In the years since then, the principles and their operationalisation have been further fine-tuned. Further details on the thresholds for each principle, and the criteria used to assess the collected evidence to score platforms, can be found in the Appendix.

It is worth noting that the Fairwork principles were updated in 2024 through the collaboration of teams from participating countries. To enhance the analysis of companies in line with the guiding principles, the Fairwork principles were refined to provide greater clarity, while preserving the project’s core principles. The project also had a second round of updates, which took place at a meeting in Asunción, Paraguay, in April 2025. This meeting specifically discussed the Latin American context of platform work, highlighting the need for a methodology that captures local issues, such as technological sovereignty and precariousness, without affecting the general structure of the principles.

STEP 1



Fair Pay

Workers, irrespective of their employment classification, should earn a fair income in their home jurisdiction after taking account of work-related costs. We assess earnings according to the mandated minimum wage in the home jurisdiction, as well as the current living wage.



Fair Conditions

Platforms should have policies in place to protect workers from foundational risks arising from the processes of work and should take proactive measures to protect and promote the health and safety of workers.



Fair Contracts

Terms and conditions should be accessible, readable and comprehensible. The party contracting with the worker must be subject to local law and must be identified in the contract. Regardless of the workers’ employment status, the contract should be free of clauses which unreasonably exclude liability on the part of the service user and/or the platform.



Fair Management

There should be a documented process through which workers can be heard, can appeal decisions affecting them, and be informed of the reasons behind those decisions. There must be a clear channel of communication to workers involving the ability to appeal management decisions or deactivation.

The use of algorithms should be transparent and result in equitable outcomes for workers. There should be an identifiable and documented policy that ensures equity in the way workers are managed on a platform (for example, in the hiring, disciplining, or firing of workers).



Fair Representation

Platforms should provide a documented process through which worker voice can be expressed. Irrespective of their employment classification, workers should have the right to organise in collective bodies, and platforms should be prepared to cooperate and negotiate with them.





STEP 2

Methodology Overview

The Fairwork project uses three approaches to effectively measure fairness of working conditions on digital labour platforms: desk research, approaching platforms for evidence, and worker interviews. Through these three methods, we seek evidence on whether platforms operate in accordance with the five Fairwork Principles.

Desk research

Each annual Fairwork ratings cycle starts with desk research to map the range of platforms to be scored, identify points of contact with management, develop suitable interview guides and survey instruments, and design recruitment strategies to access workers. For each platform, we gather and analyse a wide range of publicly available documents including contracts, terms and conditions, published policies and procedures, as well as digital interfaces.

Desk research also flags any publicly available information that could assist us in scoring different platforms: for instance, the provision of particular services to workers, or the existence of past or ongoing disputes. Once the list of platforms has been finalised, each platform is invited to participate in Fairwork's annual ranking study and provided with information about the process. For this report, eight platforms operating in Chile were identified and selected for the sample.

Platform evidence

The second method involves approaching platforms for evidence. Platform management is invited to submit evidence and discuss the platform's degree of compliance with each of the Fairwork principles. Evidence may include published policies and/or standard operating procedures, public commitments, and website/app functionality. This evidence provides insights into the operation and business model of the platform, while also opening up a dialogue through which the platform could agree to implement changes based on the principles. In cases where platform managements do not agree to participate in the research, we limit our scoring to evidence obtained through desk research and worker interviews.

Worker interviews

The third method is interviewing platform workers and their representatives directly. These interviews do not aim to be a statistically representative set of experiences. Rather, they are worker case-studies to examine platforms' policies and practices in the field as they pertain to the Fairwork principles. Specifically, they seek to gain insight into how work is carried out, and how work processes are managed and experienced, on platforms. The interviews situate platform work in the careers of workers by understanding their motivation for entry into a platform, how long they envision undertaking work on the current platform before seeking an alternative either on another platform or in a different sector, and how their experience of platform work is shaped by their interaction with fellow workers and the external labour market. These interviews also enable Fairwork researchers to see copies of the contracts issued to workers and to access the app interface, including payout and support screens. This method alerts the team to the presence of issues, but not the frequency or likelihood of their occurrence.

The worker interviews are semi-structured and make use of a series of questions relating

to the 10 Fairwork thresholds. In order to qualify for the interviews, workers have to be over the age of 18 and have worked with the platform for at least three months. For this report, the interviews were conducted in Spanish. In this round, 47 interviews were conducted online and two face-to-face, covering the eight main platforms operating in Chile.

Putting it all together

This threefold approach provides a way to cross-check the claims made by platforms, while also providing the opportunity to collect evidence from multiple sources. Final scores are collectively decided by the Fairwork team based on all three forms of evidence. Points are only awarded if sufficient evidence exists on each threshold.

STEP 3

How we score

Each of the five Fairwork principles is broken down into two points: a first point, and a second point that can only be awarded if the first point has been fulfilled. Every platform receives a score out of 10. Platforms are only given a point when they can satisfactorily demonstrate their implementation of the principles. Failing to achieve a point does not necessarily mean that a platform does not comply with the principle in question. It simply means that we are unable to evidence its compliance. The scoring involves a series of stages. First, the in-country team collates the evidence and assigns preliminary scores. The collated evidence is then sent to external reviewers for independent scoring. These reviewers are both members of the Fairwork teams in other countries, as well as members of the central Fairwork team. Once the external reviewers have assigned their scores, all reviewers meet to discuss the scores and decide the final scoring. Platforms are given the opportunity to submit further evidence to earn points that they were initially not awarded. These scores then form the final annual scoring that is published in the annual country Fairwork report. Before the publication of this report, companies rated were given the opportunity to review and comment on the findings of this report.





FAIRWORK CHILE

Scores 2025 by Principle

	1.1	1.2	2.1	2.2	3.1	3.2	4.1	4.2	5.1	5.2	Total
Cabify	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	○	○	○	5
PedidosYa	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	4
DiDi	●	○	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	2
UberEats	●	○	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	2
Uber	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Cronoshare	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
inDrive	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0
Rappi	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	0



Explaining the scores

Fair Pay

Five platforms obtained points for the first principle this year (Cabify, Pedidos Ya, Didi, Uber, and Uber Eats). One of the criteria for awarding the first point under this principle is that the platform guarantees at least the national minimum wage to its workers after costs, and that payments are made in full and within the established timeframes. In Chile, the minimum wage is CLP 529,000 per month (approximately USD 580) for a 44-hour working week, or CLP 2,903 per hour (approximately USD 3.20). The main work-related expenses that drivers and couriers must cover are fuel, vehicle maintenance, tolls, and food, which together represent between 20 and 40 per cent of their income. Taking these costs into account, our interviews with workers suggest that their earnings reach the minimum wage after costs. However, only in the cases of Cabify and Pedidos Ya did we find evidence that all workers are guaranteed a minimum income above the Chilean minimum wage. To achieve this, the remaining platforms must provide transparency through formal documentation demonstrating that this minimum income is guaranteed.

The second point could only be awarded to Cabify and Pedidos Ya. To meet this threshold, platforms must demonstrate that all their workers receive a living wage for 44 hours of work per week. The Global Living Wage Coalition establishes that in Chile a living wage corresponds to CLP 811,442 per month (approximately USD 885). Information provided by our interviewees and the companies suggests that only Cabify and Pedidos Ya may be ensuring living wages for their workers after costs. However, for the remaining platforms analysed, and as with the first point under this criterion, it is not possible to award the score, as we did not find or receive documented guarantees of an explicit commitment to ensuring a living wage for all workers.

Fair Conditions

This year, only two of the analysed platforms obtained a point under the Fairwork principle of Fair Conditions. To receive the first point, platforms must ensure that they provide, at no cost, the equipment and training necessary to protect workers' health and safety, as well as offer some form of insurance covering work-related accidents, theft, or vehicle damage. Regarding the provision of equipment and insurance, evidence was found that only two platforms (Cabify and Pedidos Ya) adopt these measures. In terms of safety training, workers reported optional tutorials and safety guidelines, but no evidence was found that such training is mandatory for all workers.

With respect to coverage of costs associated with traffic accidents, material damage, or theft, publicly available information shows that only six platforms (Uber, Uber Eats, inDrive, Cabify, and Pedidos Ya) offer insurance covering these situations. Only in the cases of Cabify and Pedidos Ya was it possible to verify the existence of the insurance and its coverage, regardless of the fact that other platforms provide general information about the existence of insurance on their websites, but without further detail regarding its scope.



The second point under this principle may be given to platforms that take concrete measures to support workers' social security, such as continued payments during vacation, illness, or pregnancy, and ensuring that extended periods of inactivity on the platform do not result in negative consequences. Once again, no platform obtained this point, as it can only be granted if the first point is achieved. Moreover, evidence gathered through the worker interviews indicates that none of the platforms studied could evidence that they provide this type of benefits, and therefore they did not meet the requirements for this threshold.

The absence of points for this principle across all platforms indicates that there is still work to be done regarding the provision of basic safety equipment and training, and that the responsibility for covering the costs of adverse situations continues to fall on the workers.

Fair Contracts

Of the eight platforms analysed, five obtained the first point under this principle, which requires offering clear and transparent contracts or terms and conditions, ensuring that workers have permanent access to them, and that they have legal recourse in case the counterparty fails to comply with these conditions. We note positively that Cabify, Pedidos Ya, Didi, Uber, and Uber Eats were able to demonstrate that they clearly identify themselves as established companies subject to national legislation; that workers are required to read and sign the relevant terms or contracts; that these do not include clauses that violate Chilean legal frameworks; that workers can access them at all times; and that their data are stored and protected securely. Unfortunately, the evidence gathered fails to demonstrate that Rappi requires the signature or explicit consent of the platform's terms and conditions from their workers, and that inDrive and Cronoshare are not properly established in Chile and therefore Chilean law is not applicable to the platform.

The second point can be awarded if platforms do not include unfair clauses in their terms or contracts, if these indicate that responsibilities and risks are shared with workers, and if they provide details on how dynamic fares are set when algorithms are involved. None of the platforms that obtained the first point could demonstrate that they provide detailed information on how algorithms determine fares and payment amounts, nor do they clarify any company liability for negligence. For this reason, the second point could not be awarded to any platform.

Fair Management

Only one of the eight platforms evaluated this year received a score under this principle. To obtain the first point, platforms must demonstrate that they have effective and easily accessible channels through which workers can be assisted by human staff to appeal disciplinary or sanctioning measures, such as low ratings or account deactivations. Evidence gathered from our interviews with workers indicates that across all platforms they face difficulties when attempting to appeal account deactivations, which in many cases blocks their access to the applications. In addition, there is little clarity regarding whether the support received is automated or handled by humans, as the workers interviewed reported not knowing this for certain and there was no explicit information on this matter in the platforms' terms and conditions or contracts. In the case of Cabify, evidence was collected indicating that workers have the possibility of communicating with human agents to receive support when needed, and that in the event of being deac-

tivated from the app, they have clear and accessible appeal mechanisms available through email and in-person assistance.

The second point may be awarded if platforms obtain the first point and present evidence of a commitment to equity and the absence of discrimination against disadvantaged groups. Platforms could move towards fairer management, and significant progress could be achieved if they were to make transparent the criteria for account deactivations, the corresponding appeal processes, and the functioning and criteria of algorithms used for work allocation.

Fair Representation

This year, none of the platforms included in the study obtained points relating to fair representation. To earn the first point, evidence must show that platforms acknowledge and guarantee freedom of association and the collective voice of their workers, demonstrating an explicit willingness and a documented mechanism for negotiation between both parties. Although some platforms, such as Cabify, express a commitment to two-way dialogue with workers through their official channels, no evidence was found of established mechanisms for the expression of workers' collective voice on any platform. For this reason, the point could not be awarded.

Platforms may obtain the second point under this principle if they demonstrate the willingness and mechanisms for negotiation with workers' bodies or ensure that workers play an important role in the platform's governance, officially recognizing associations or unions publicly and demonstrating that these have influence in decision-making processes. Unfortunately, besides not meeting the first requirement, none of the platforms showed recognition of worker organizations, nor that workers play an important role in their governance, making it impossible to award this second point.



PLATFORM IN FOCUS

Cronoshare

Cronoshare is a platform founded in Spain in 2012, which has been officially operating in Chile since January 2025. This digital platform is designed to connect clients with professionals from various service sectors, such as cleaning, repairs, care work, and consultancy. After consolidating its position in Spain, the company began an international expansion process that led it to Italy (2016), Brazil (2018), Mexico (2021), and, most recently, Chile. Its operating model is based on a system of digital intermediation: clients post service requests and interested professionals access contact details through a credit-based system, allowing them to compare offers, review profiles, and make informed decisions.

In Chile, Cronoshare has experienced rapid adoption, closing its first operational period with more than 300,000 visits and over 21,000 managed requests,⁵⁶ reflecting its potential in a context of increasing digitalisation and the search for online labour. The platform has had a particularly significant impact on professionals and small enterprises facing barriers to digital positioning, offering them visibility, control over investment, and access to new clients. Looking ahead, Cronoshare plans to expand its range of services—including both in-person and online tasks—and to strengthen its quality assurance and evaluation systems, with the aim of consolidating itself as a relevant actor in the Chilean services market.

In this report, all Cronoshare interviewees offer domestic work services, mainly cleaning and care work. Domestic work is a predominantly female sector: women make up 80% of domestic workers across the Americas⁵⁷ and roughly 7.9% of Chile's occupied female workforce.⁵⁸

Domestic work in Chile has deep historical roots linked to class, gender, and ethnic inequalities inherited from the colonial period, when these tasks were carried out under relations of servitude and without labour recognition. Throughout much of the twentieth century, it continued to be an informal occupation performed primarily by poor women and migrants from rural areas to the cities. Although legislation began to address domestic work as early as 1931, the lack of effective enforcement sustained labour precarity. The mass incorporation of women into paid employment during the 1940s and 1950s increased the demand for domestic workers, reinforcing the “care chain,” whereby women delegate domestic tasks to other women, perpetuating structural inequalities.⁵⁹

Collective organisation within the sector progressed slowly due to the isolation inherent to this type of work; however, trade unions such as SINTRACAP and ANECAP played a key role throughout the twentieth century, even under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, articulating demands alongside the feminist movement and the Catholic Church. From the 1990s onwards, gradual improvements were introduced—such as severance pay and weekly rest—although always lagging behind other sectors. The ratification of the International Labour Convention No. 189 and the enactment of Law No. 20,785 in 2015 marked significant milestones in the regulation of contracts, working hours, and rest periods. Regulation in this sector has improved steadily over the last decade: from 2010 to 2019, the percentage of women working formally in this sector increased from 42.3% to 50%.⁶⁰ Formalization played an important role in maintaining employment for these workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, domestic work remains a vulnerable sector, whose history reveals the persistence of inequalities and the need to strengthen social protection and recognition of this labour.

Individuals describe the services they offer on Cronoshare's website, including a profile photo and additional images relating to domestic work. The site also displays ratings from clients who have requested services, allowing them to award up to five stars. According to the interviews with workers conducted for this study, Cronoshare's intermediation tends to prioritise client demands, while giving limited consideration to the needs of domestic workers, who, through this platform, must comply with rules and conditions in order to continue accessing work opportunities.

Interviews highlighted multiple vulnerabilities in the working conditions of domestic workers associated with the use of Cronoshare. Because the platform is not officially established in Chile, Chilean law does not apply to the relationship it forms with its users, leaving workers without legal protection against discrimination, unjustified account deactivations, or unfair negative reviews that directly affect their access to employment opportunities. In addition, no evidence was found of official platform policies ensuring a minimum wage for hours worked, creating conditions that can amount to precarious labour. Despite the platform facilitating easy access to employment, the unregulated work arrangements enabled by such digital platforms pose a risk to the progress Chile has made toward the formalisation of domestic work to improve working conditions.

Workers's stories

Boris*, PedidosYa⁶¹

Boris* is 22 years old and has been working for nearly three years for PedidosYa, making deliveries on his bicycle as a supplementary activity while studying for a degree in social work at university. After his morning classes, he takes orders through the app until 9 at night. His experience with the platform has been complex. On the one hand, it has allowed him to finance various household expenses that his parents previously covered. On the other hand, it has also brought him various frustrations and unfair situations.

He recounts with indignation, for example, that he recently received an assignment for an 8-kilometer delivery uphill in Santiago, which paid only between 2000 and 5000 CLP (approximately 2-5 USD).

“Imagine that, on a bicycle. So, imagine the uphill climb I had to deal with.”

The problem, Boris points out, is that while workers are free to reject a delivery that doesn't suit them, this decision has consequences for their order acceptance rate, and therefore, for the priority they have in choosing shifts that work for them the following week. For Boris, it is crucial to be able to choose his schedules, since his studies take up a large part of his day and he doesn't have much time to work. He feels a lot of pressure from the platform's demands to make work fit with his studies:

“You have to have a 100% acceptance rate, fulfill all the hours, that is, if you signed up from 8 until 4 or 5 in the afternoon, you have to complete it, arrive 30 minutes early and log in.”

At times, the orders Boris receives are excessively heavy or inconvenient to carry by bicycle, such as water drums or bags of pet food. The fact that the platform does not consider the type of vehicle when assigning orders can result in various negative consequences for delivery workers, such as damage to the products being delivered (which affects their rating) or even traffic accidents.

Elena*, Cronoshare

Elena* is 52 years old and has been offering her house cleaning services on Cronoshare since 2022. She first heard of the platform as an alternative to find jobs more easily and faster, and she has since been able to secure three to four jobs a week. The algorithm allows potential clients to find her profile, review her service rates, and establish direct contact. However, it's not the platform that pays her once the job is done, but the client. She is grateful that the platform provides her with the exposure at no cost, but she worries that this might change, and a commission fee could be imposed.

Elena shares her frustration about being treated unfairly by clients on multiple occasions. Once, while working alongside a colleague, a client reluctantly asked her to leave without explanation and gave her a negative rating on the platform. She avoided mentioning anything to the client:

“Sometimes you have to bite your tongue a lot at work. You don't want them to rate you badly on the platform or stop giving you jobs,”

she says. But the next day, Elena's account was deactivated, and she was unable to work for several days. Since the platform lacks a system for workers to rate clients, Elena had no way to share her side of the story. Her only option for resolving the issue was to contact support via email. After some days conversing back and forth with platform executives explaining her case, her account was finally reactivated.

As mentioned above, Chile has made key advancements towards formalisation of domestic work to ensure better working conditions in this field. However, the growth of unregulated digital platforms, such as the one Elena uses, puts these achievements at risk. When there's no proper oversight, unequal power relations emerge where workers have few options to protect themselves from unfair dismissals, a problem that could be avoided with better monitoring and accountability mechanisms.

*Names changed to protect worker identities.





IN FOCUS

Informal labour and platforms

Labour informality is a structural feature of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean. In mid-2024, the average regional informality rate stood at 47.6%, reflecting a slight improvement from the 48.0% recorded in 2023, yet still leaving almost half of the employed population outside of formal social protection.⁶² In Chile, while the situation is comparatively better, the phenomenon persists as a challenge. During the July-September 2025 quarter, the informal occupation rate in the country was 26.2%, affecting approximately 2.46 million people.⁶³ This framework of structural precarity sets the stage for understanding the insertion and functioning of digital platform work.

The profile of platform workers in Chile presents distinctive characteristics that reflect and highlight dynamics of informality. The distribution by platform type shows a marked segmentation: 83.4% of workers perform their duties in transportation applications, compared to 16.6% in delivery, with only 8% reporting working in both sectors.

Similarly, this segmentation is emphasized by national origin. While Chilean workers are concentrated in transportation platforms, the migrant population has covered a large part of the demand in delivery applications, which offer a quicker entry into the labour market but provide less social protection.⁶⁴ This situation is echoed in the testimony of a Venezuelan Rappi delivery worker:

“It was the quickest thing I found when I arrived (in Chile). It’s difficult to find stable work as a foreigner, so the apps were a door.”

Labour trajectories on platforms are characterized by high turnover, with a low probability of workers remaining from one quarter to the next.⁶⁵ However, this general instability hides divergent patterns determined by previous work history. For some workers coming from formal employment, platforms can function as a temporary “buffer,” facilitating a transition to new formal employment.⁶⁶

In contrast, workers coming from informal jobs in more traditional sectors not only have a higher probability of entering the platform economy but also face greater difficulties in leaving it.⁶⁷ In this way, far from being a bridge, platforms function as a space of prolonged precarity for those who were already in a situation of vulnerability. The experience of an Uber driver is eloquent in this regard:



“I became unemployed and, since I had a vehicle, I decided to work on the app while I looked for a stable job. Until now, I have not been able to reintegrate into formal work.”

Simultaneously, informal practices such as account renting persist,⁶⁸ particularly among migrant workers. Despite the real-time identity verification measures implemented by the platforms, they have not achieved effective control over this practice. The direct consequence of this is that the person using the rented account is not the one who signed the agreement with the platform and therefore cannot be identified by the Chilean IRS (“Servicio de Impuestos Internos”) nor receive the corresponding assistance from the application in case of an accident. This situation deepens the conditions of informality in the sector and leaves workers without any legal or social protection.

In summary, the platform economy does not constitute an alternative for overcoming informality; rather, it articulates with it, reproducing and deepening a cycle of precarity for a significant segment of the labour force. This reinforces the urgency of critically evaluating the role of these applications in the Chilean labour market and of advancing mechanisms that guarantee fair working conditions.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Pathways of Change

Fairwork's theory of change relies on a humanist belief in the power of empathy and knowledge. If they have the economic means to choose, many consumers will be discerning about the platform services they use. Our yearly ratings give consumers the ability to choose the highest scoring platform operating in a sector, thus contributing to pressure on platforms to improve their working conditions and their scores. In this way, we leverage consumer solidarity with workers' allies in the fight for fairer working conditions. Beyond individual consumer choices, our scores can help inform the procurement, investment and partnership policies of large organisations. They can serve as a reference for institutions and companies who want to ensure they are supporting fair labour practices. In this regard, we see four pathways to change (Figure 1).




FIGURE 1. Fairwork's Pathways to Change

Our fieldwork data, combined with feedback from workshops and consultations involving workers, informs how we systematically evolve the Fairwork principles to remain in line with their needs. There is nothing inevitable about poor working conditions in the platform economy. Despite their claims to the contrary, platforms have substantial control over the nature of the jobs that they mediate. Workers who find their jobs through platforms are ultimately workers, and there is no basis for denying them the key rights and protections that their counterparts in the formal sector have long enjoyed. Our scores show that the platform economy, as we know it today, already takes many forms, with some platforms displaying greater concern for workers' needs than others. This means that we do not accept low pay, poor conditions, inequity, and a lack of agency and voice as the norm. We hope that our work – by highlighting the contours of today's platform economy – paints a picture of what it could become.




FIGURE 2. Fairwork Principles: Continuous Worker-guided Evolution

This year, the Fairwork Chile team has participated in various forums alongside regulators, worker representatives, and platform companies, as well as in academic settings. The aim has been to present and disseminate the results of work conducted over the past five years analyzing the working conditions of platform workers.

A particularly relevant instance was our participation in meetings organized by the Undersecretariat of Labor and the Higher Labor Council, aimed at analyzing the



implementation of Law No. 21,431, which regulates platform work in Chile. On this occasion, we presented a series of observations intended to contribute evidence to the improvement of this legal instrument. This process seeks to: (1) generate evidence, gather inputs, and integrate recommendations for the third and final evaluation of Law No. 21,431; (2) learn about, examine, and assess developments in the international discussion promoted by the ILO regarding the digital platform economy, fostering the achievement of tripartite consensus; and (3) promote social dialogue and informed public debate on the impacts of artificial intelligence, algorithmic management, and other emerging technologies on the labor market, as well as the challenges these pose for ensuring decent work and safeguarding fundamental rights in labor relations.

In November of this year, the Fairwork Chile team organized a seminar on the present and future of platform work in the country, together with the Center for the Study of Conflict and Social Cohesion (COES). The event brought together representatives from the ILO, the National Statistics Institute, platform companies such as PedidosYa, and the Ministry of Labor. This forum enabled the sharing of perspectives and the fostering of dialogue aimed at academic and institutional collaboration.



The Fairwork Pledge

As part of this process of change, we have introduced the Fairwork pledge. This pledge leverages the power of organisations' procurement, investment, and partnership policies to support fairer platform work. Organisations like universities, schools, businesses, and charities who make use of platform labour can make a difference by supporting the best labour practices, guided by our five principles of fair work. Organisations who sign the pledge get to display our badge on company organisational materials.

The pledge constitutes two levels. The first is as an official Fairwork Supporter, which entails publicly demonstrating support for fairer platform work, and making resources available to staff and members to help them in deciding which platforms to engage with. We are proud to announce that we have six official Fairwork Supporters in Germany: the Digital Transformation Centers, the Berliner Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales, the ISF Munich, the IfS Frankfurt, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung's Competence Centre Future of Work, and Algorithmwatch. A second level of the pledge entails organisations committing to concrete and meaningful changes in their own practices as official Fairwork Partners, for example by committing to using better-rated platforms where there is a choice. The Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), the GIZ, the Deutscher Verband der freien Übersetzer und Dolmetscher e. V. (DVÜD), the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG), and McDonald's Germany have become official Fairwork Partners in Germany

**More information on the pledge,
and how to sign up, is available at
fair.work/pledge**





APPENDIX I

Fairwork Scoring System

Which companies are covered by the Fairwork principles?

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines a “digital labour platform” as an enterprise that mediates and facilitates “labour exchange between different users, such as businesses, workers and consumers”.⁶⁹ That includes digital labour “marketplaces” where “businesses set up the tasks and requirements and the platforms match these to a global pool of workers who can complete the tasks within the specified time”.⁷⁰ Marketplaces that do not facilitate labour exchanges - for example, Airbnb (which matches owners of accommodation with those seeking to rent short term accommodation) and eBay (which matches buyers and sellers of goods) are obviously excluded from the definition. The ILO’s definition of “digital labour platform” is widely accepted and includes many different business models.⁷¹ Fairwork’s research covers digital labour platforms that fall within this definition that aim to connect individual service providers with consumers of the service through the platform interface. Fairwork’s research does not cover platforms that mediate offers of employment between individuals and employers (whether on a long-term or on a temporary basis).

Fairwork distinguishes between two types of these platforms. The first, is ‘geographically tethered’ platforms where the work is required to be done in a particular location such as delivering food from a restaurant to an apartment, driving a person from one part of town to another or cleaning. These are often referred to as ‘gig work platforms’. The second is ‘cloudwork’ platforms where the work can, in theory, be performed from any location via the internet.

The thresholds for meeting each principle are different for location-based and cloudwork platforms because location-based work platforms can be benchmarked against local market factors, risks/harms, and regulations that apply in that country, whereas cloudwork platforms cannot because (by their nature) the work can be performed from anywhere and so different market factors, risks/harms, and regulations apply depending on where the work is performed.

The platforms covered by Fairwork’s research have different business, revenue and governance models including employment-based, subcontractor, commission-based, franchise, piece-rate, shift-based, subscription models. Some of those models involve the platforms making direct payments to workers (including through sub-contractors).



How does the scoring system work?

The five Principles of Fairwork were developed through an extensive literature review of published research on job quality, stakeholder meetings at UNCTAD and the ILO in Geneva (involving platform operators, policymakers, trade unions, and academics), and in-country meetings with local stakeholders. Each Fairwork Principle is divided into two points. Accordingly, for each Principle, the scoring system allows the first to be awarded corresponding to the first threshold, and an additional second point to be awarded corresponding to the second threshold. The second point under each Principle can only be awarded if the first point for that Principle has been awarded. The thresholds specify the evidence required for a platform to receive a given point. Where no verifiable evidence is available that meets a given threshold, the platform is not awarded that point. A platform can therefore receive a maximum Fairwork score of 10 points. Fairwork scores are updated on a yearly basis; the scores presented in this report were derived from data pertaining to the three months between August 2025 and October 2025.

Principle	First Point	Second Point	Total
 Principle 1 Fair Pay	 Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs	 Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs	 2
 Principle 2 Fair Conditions	 Mitigates task-specific risks	 Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net	 2
 Principle 3 Fair Contracts	 Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions	 Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed	 2
 Principle 4 Fair Management	 Provides due process for decisions affecting workers	 Provides equity in the management process	 2
 Principle 5 Fair Representation	 Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice	 Supports democratic governance	 2

Maximum possible Fairwork Score:



Principle 1:

Fair Pay

1.1 – Ensures workers earn at least the local minimum wage after costs (one point) Platform workers often have substantial work-related costs to cover, such as transport between jobs, supplies, or fuel, insurance, and maintenance on a vehicle.⁷² Workers' costs sometimes mean their take-home earnings may fall below the local minimum wage.⁷³ Workers also absorb the costs of extra time commitment, when they spend time waiting or travelling between jobs, or other unpaid activities necessary for their work, such as mandatory training, which are also considered active hours.⁷⁴ To achieve this point platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local minimum wage. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure both of the following: • Payment must be on time and in-full. • Workers earn at least the local minimum wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs.⁷⁵

1.2 – Ensures workers earn at least a local living wage after costs (one additional point) In some places, the minimum wage is not enough to allow workers to afford a basic but decent standard of living. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that work-related costs do not push workers below local living wage. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure the following: • Workers earn at least a local living wage, or the wage set by collective sectoral agreement (whichever is higher) in the place where they work, in their active hours, after costs.⁷⁶⁻⁷⁷

Principle 2:

Fair Conditions

2.1 – Mitigates task-specific risks (one point) Platform workers may encounter a number of risks in the course of their work, including accidents and injuries, harmful materials, and crime and violence. To achieve this point, platforms must show that they are aware of these risks and take basic steps to mitigate them. The platform must satisfy the following: • Adequate equipment and training are provided to protect workers' health and safety from task-specific risks.⁷⁸ These should be implemented at no additional cost to the worker. • The platform mitigates the risks of lone working by providing adequate support and designing processes with occupational safety and health in mind. • Platforms take meaningful steps to ensure that workers do not suffer significant costs as a result of accident, injury or disease resulting from work.

2.2 – Ensures safe working conditions and a safety net (one additional point) Platform workers are vulnerable to the possibility of abruptly losing their income as the result of unexpected or external circumstances, such as, for example, sickness, or parenthood. Most countries provide a social safety net to ensure workers don't experience sudden poverty due to circumstances outside their control.⁷⁹ However, platform workers usually don't qualify for protections such as sick pay, because of their independent contractor status. In recognition of the fact that most workers are dependent on income they earn from platform work, platforms should ensure that workers are compensated for loss of income due to inability to work. In addition, platforms must minimise the risk of sickness and injury even when all the basic steps have been taken. The platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • The platform takes meaningful steps towards the social protection of its workers. • Where workers are unable to work for an extended period due to unexpected circumstances, their standing on the platform is not negatively impacted. • The platform implements policies or practices that protect workers' safety from task-specific risks. In particular, the platform should ensure that pay is not structured in a way that incentivizes workers to take excessive levels of risk.

Principle 3:

Fair Contracts

3.1 – Provides clear and transparent terms and conditions (one point) The terms and conditions governing platform work are not always clear and accessible to workers.⁸⁰ To achieve this point, the platform must demonstrate that workers are able to understand, agree to, and access the conditions of their work at all times and that they have legal recourse if the other party breaches those conditions. The platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • The party contracting with the worker must be identified in the contract, and subject to the law of the country/ state/region in which the worker works. • The contract/terms & conditions are presented in full in clear and comprehensible language that all workers could be expected to understand. • Workers have to sign a contract and/or give informed consent to terms of conditions upon signing up for the platform. • The contracts/terms and conditions are easily accessible to workers in paper form, or via the app/ platform interface at all times. • Contracts/terms & conditions do not include clauses that revert prevailing legal frameworks in the respective countries. • Platforms take adequate, responsible and ethical data protection and management measures, laid out in a documented policy.⁸¹

3.2 – Ensures that no unfair contract terms are imposed (one additional point) In some cases, especially under 'independent contractor' classifications, workers carry a disproportionate amount of risk for engaging in a contract with the service user. They may be liable for any damage arising in the course of their work, and they may be prevented by unfair clauses from seeking legal redress for grievances. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate that risks and liability of engaging in the work is shared between parties. Regardless of how the contractual status of the worker is classified, the platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • Every worker is notified of proposed changes in clear and understandable language within a reasonable timeframe before changes come into effect; and the changes should not reverse existing accrued benefits and reasonable expectations on which workers have relied. • The contract/terms and conditions neither include clauses which exclude liability for negligence nor unreasonably exempt the platform from liability for working conditions. The platform takes appropriate steps to ensure that the contract does not include clauses which prevent workers from effectively seeking redress for grievances which arise from the working relationship. • In case platform labour is mediated by subcontractors: The platform implements a reliable mechanism to monitor and ensure that the subcontractor is living up to the standards expected from the platform itself regarding working conditions. • In cases where algorithms are used to determine pricing, bonuses, ratings and/or allocate jobs, the data collected, and calculations used must be transparent and documented in a form available to workers in clear and comprehensible language that all workers could be expected to understand.

Principle 4:

Fair Management

4.1 – Provides due process for decisions affecting workers (one point) Platform workers can experience arbitrary deactivation; being barred from accessing the platform without explanation and potentially losing their income. Workers may be subject to other penalties or disciplinary decisions without the ability to contact the service user or the platform to challenge or appeal them if they believe they are unfair. To achieve this point, platforms must demonstrate an avenue for workers to meaningfully appeal disciplinary actions. The platform must satisfy ALL of the following: • There is an easily accessible channel for workers to communicate with a human representative of the platform and to effectively solve problems. This channel is documented in the contract and available on the platform interface. Platforms should respond to workers within a reasonable timeframe. • There is a process for

workers to meaningfully and effectively appeal low ratings, non-payment, payment issues, deactivations, and other penalties and disciplinary actions. This process is documented in a contract and available on the platform interface.⁸² • In the case of deactivations, the appeals process must be available to workers who no longer have access to the platform. • Workers are not disadvantaged for voicing concerns or appealing disciplinary actions.

4.2 – Provides equity in the management process (one additional point) The majority of platforms do not actively discriminate against particular groups of workers. However, they may inadvertently exacerbate already existing inequalities in their design and management. For example, there is a lot of gender segregation between different types of platform work. To achieve this point, platforms must show not only that they have policies against discrimination, but also that they seek to remove barriers for disadvantaged groups and promote inclusion. Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following: • The platform has an effective anti-discrimination policy laying out a clear process for reporting, correcting and penalising discrimination of workers on the platform on grounds such as race, social origin, caste, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sex, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, disability, religion or belief, age or any other status.⁸³ • The platform has measures in place to promote diversity, equality and inclusion on the platform. It takes practical measures to promote equality of opportunity for workers from disadvantaged groups, including reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, disability, and religion or belief. • Where persons from a disadvantaged group (such as women) are significantly under-represented among a pool of workers, it seeks to identify and remove barriers to access by persons from that group. • If algorithms are used to determine access to work or remuneration or the type of work and pay scales available to workers seeking to use the platform, these are transparent and do not result in inequitable outcomes for workers from historically or currently disadvantaged groups. • It has mechanisms to reduce the risk of users discriminating against workers from disadvantaged groups in accessing and carrying out work.

Principle 5:

Fair Representation

5.1 – Assures freedom of association and the expression of worker voice (one point) Freedom of association is a fundamental right for all workers, and enshrined in the constitution of the International Labour Organisation, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The right for workers to organise, collectively express their wishes – and importantly – be listened to, is an important prerequisite for fair working conditions. However, rates of organisation amongst platform workers remain low. To achieve this point, platforms must ensure that the conditions are in place to encourage the expression of collective worker voice. Platforms must satisfy ALL of the following: • There is a documented mechanism⁸⁴ for the expression of collective worker voice that allows ALL workers, regardless of employment status, to participate without risks. • There is a formal, written statement of willingness to recognise, and bargain with, a collective, independent body of workers or trade union, that is clearly communicated to all workers, and available on the platform interface⁸⁵. • Freedom of association is not inhibited, and workers are not disadvantaged in any way for communicating their concerns, wishes and demands to the platform, or expressing willingness to form independent collective bodies of representation⁸⁶⁻⁸⁷.

5.2 – Supports democratic governance (one additional point). While rates of organisation remain low, platform workers' associations are emerging in many sectors and countries. We are also seeing a growing number of cooperative worker-owned platforms. To realise

fair representation, workers must have a say in the conditions of their work. This could be through a democratically governed cooperative model, a formally recognised union, or the ability to undertake collective bargaining with the platform. The platform must satisfy at least ONE of the following: • Workers play a meaningful role in governing it. • In a written document available at all times on the platform interface, the platform publicly and formally recognises an independent collective body of workers, an elected works council, or trade union. This recognition is not exclusive and, when the legal framework allows, the platform should recognise any significant collective body seeking representation⁸⁸.



APPENDIX II

Platform comments

Prior to publication, all companies rated were given an opportunity to review the score and provide a comment. Below are all of the responses we received from the companies.

Pedidos Ya:

It is important to note that since 2019, all couriers working with Pedidos Ya have been engaged under service provision contracts, with their earnings paid through boletas de honorarios, enabling independent workers to access social security.

Since the entry into force of Law No. 21,431 in September 2022, couriers have also had access to occupational health and safety training, insurance for personal belongings, and personal protective equipment, among other matters addressed by this legislation. At the same time, through a partnership with Mutual de Seguridad, almost all couriers on the platform are able to use the Occupational Accident Insurance as independent workers at all health centres of this institution.

In addition, the ecosystem created by Pedidos Ya allows individuals providing services to earn high incomes, on average close to twice the proportional minimum hourly wage, with flexible schedules and without discrimination. This makes it a concrete option that supports local and household economies in more than 120 municipalities, from Arica to Punta Arenas.





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Endnotes

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73 La OIT define el salario mínimo como la "cantidad mínima de remuneración que un empleador está obligado a pagar a los asalariados por el trabajo realizado durante un período determinado, que no puede ser reducida por un convenio colectivo ni por un contrato individual". Las leyes de salario mínimo protegen a los trabajadores de remuneraciones indebidamente bajas y les ayudan a alcanzar un nivel mínimo de vida. El Convenio sobre la fijación del salario mínimo de la OIT, 1970 (C135), establece las condiciones y requisitos para la determinación de los salarios mínimos y exhorta a todos los países que lo han ratificado a actuar en conformidad. Las leyes de salario mínimo existen en más del 90 % de los Estados miembros de la OIT.

74 Además de las horas de trabajo directo en las que los trabajadores realizan tareas, también dedican tiempo a llevar a cabo actividades no remuneradas necesarias para su trabajo, como esperar pedidos de reparto en restaurantes, trasladarse entre pedidos y realizar capacitaciones obligatorias (es decir, actividades de formación que deben completarse para que los trabajadores puedan seguir accediendo a trabajo en la plataforma). Estas horas de trabajo indirecto también se consideran parte de las horas activas, ya que los trabajadores están destinando ese tiempo a la plataforma. Así, las "horas activas" se definen como aquellas que incluyen tanto las horas de trabajo directas como las indirectas.

75 Para acreditar esto, cuando la plataforma es responsable de pagar a los trabajadores, debe cumplir al menos una de las siguientes condiciones: (a) contar con una política documentada que garantice que los trabajadores reciban al menos el salario mínimo local después de costos, durante sus horas activas; o (b) proporcionar estadísticas resumidas sobre las transacciones y los costos.

76 Cuando no existe un salario digno, Fairwork utilizará la Metodología Anker de la Global Living Wage Coalition para estimarlo.

77 Para acreditar esto, cuando la plataforma es responsable de pagar a los trabajadores, debe cumplir al menos una de las siguientes condiciones:

(a) contar con una política documentada que garantice que los trabajadores reciban al menos el salario digno local después de costos, durante sus horas activas; o (b) proporcionar estadísticas resumidas de datos de transacciones y costos que demuestren que todos los trabajadores obtienen un salario digno después de costos.

78 La OIT reconoce la seguridad y la salud en el trabajo como un derecho fundamental. Cuando la plataforma contrata directamente al trabajador, el punto de partida es el Convenio sobre seguridad y salud en el trabajo de la OIT, 1981 (C155). Este establece que los empleadores deben garantizar que, "en la medida en que sea razonablemente posible, los lugares de trabajo, la maquinaria, los equipos y los procesos bajo su control sean seguros y no impliquen riesgos para la salud", y que, "cuando sea necesario, se proporcione vestimenta de protección y equipos de protección adecuados para prevenir, en la medida en que sea razonablemente posible, el riesgo de accidentes o de efectos adversos para la salud".

79 El Convenio sobre la Seguridad Social (Norma mínima), 1952 (núm. 102) de la OIT establece nueve clases de prestaciones (atención médica y prestaciones en caso de enfermedad, desempleo, vejez, accidentes del trabajo, prestaciones familiares, maternidad, invalidez y supervivencia). Fuente: <https://webapps.ilo.org/public/english/revue/download/pdf/ghai.pdf>, p. 122.

80 El Convenio sobre el Trabajo Marítimo de la OIT, 2006 (MLC 2006), Regla 2.1, y el Convenio sobre las Trabajadoras y los Trabajadores Domésticos, 2011 (C189), artículos 7 y 15, sirven como ejemplos orientadores útiles de disposiciones adecuadas en los términos y condiciones de trabajo, así como del acceso de los trabajadores a dichos términos y condiciones.

81 Tal como se establece en los estándares internacionales, la protección ética de los datos incluye aspectos como la legitimidad y legalidad, la proporcionalidad, la limitación de la finalidad, la transparencia, la calidad de los datos, los derechos de las personas titulares de los datos (acceso, rectificación, evaluación, supresión y portabilidad), la rendición de cuentas y los derechos colectivos. Asimismo, en el uso de inteligencia artificial, se incluyen los derechos a ser informado sobre su utilización y a contar con una interfaz humana.

82 Los trabajadores deben tener la opción de escalar los reclamos que no hayan sido abordados de manera satisfactoria y, en el caso de decisiones automatizadas, deben contar con la posibilidad de escalarlos para su mediación por una persona.

83 Conforme con el Convenio núm. 111 de la OIT relativo a la discriminación en materia de empleo y ocupación y con la legislación nacional aplicable.

84 Un mecanismo para la expresión colectiva de la voz de los trabajadores permitirá que estos participen en la definición de las agendas, de modo que puedan plantear los temas que más les preocupan. Este mecanismo puede ser de carácter presencial o virtual

(por ejemplo, reuniones en línea) y debe implicar una interacción significativa (por ejemplo, no limitarse a encuestas). Asimismo, debe permitir que todos los trabajadores participen en reuniones periódicas con la dirección.

85 Por ejemplo: "[La plataforma] apoyará cualquier esfuerzo de sus trabajadores por organizarse colectivamente o formar un sindicato. La negociación colectiva a través de sindicatos a menudo puede generar condiciones de trabajo más favorables"

86 Véase el Convenio sobre la libertad sindical y la protección del derecho de sindicación de la OIT, 1948 (C087), que establece que "los trabajadores y los empleadores, sin distinción alguna, tienen derecho a constituir las organizaciones que estimen convenientes, así como a afiliarse a ellas, sin autorización previa" (artículo 2); que "las autoridades públicas deberán abstenerse de toda intervención que tienda a limitar este derecho o a entorpecer su ejercicio legal" (artículo 3); y que "las organizaciones de trabajadores y de empleadores no estarán sujetas a disolución o suspensión por vía administrativa" (artículo 4).

De manera similar, el Convenio sobre el derecho de sindicación y de negociación colectiva de la OIT, 1949 (C098), protege a los trabajadores contra actos de discriminación antisindical en el empleo, señalando que no afiliarse a un sindicato o renunciar a la afiliación sindical no puede establecerse como condición de empleo ni como causa de despido. De los 185 Estados miembros de la OIT, actualmente 155 han ratificado el C087 y 167 han ratificado el C098.

87 Si los trabajadores optan por buscar representación a través de una entidad colectiva independiente de trabajadores o de un sindicato que no sea reconocido de manera inmediata por la plataforma, esta debería estar abierta a adoptar múltiples canales de representación, cuando el marco legal lo permita, o a buscar formas de incorporar las inquietudes de los trabajadores en su comunicación con la entidad representativa existente.

88 Si los trabajadores optan por buscar representación a través de una entidad colectiva independiente de trabajadores o de un sindicato que no sea reconocido de manera inmediata por la plataforma, esta debería estar abierta a adoptar múltiples canales de representación, cuando el marco legal lo permita, o a buscar formas de incorporar las inquietudes de los trabajadores en su comunicación con la entidad representativa existente.

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